Re: Problem with ssl and psql in Postgresql 13

I've got one last complaint about the backend GSS code: we are doing
things randomly differently in the two places that install
krb_server_keyfile as the active KRB5_KTNAME value. secure_open_gssapi()
sets KRB5_KTNAME unconditionally (and doesn't bother to check for error,
either, not a good thing in a security-critical operation). But the older
code in pg_GSS_recvauth() is written to not override KRB5_KTNAME if it's
already set. This of-course-totally-undocumented behavior seems like a
fairly bad idea to me: as things stand, the client-side choice of whether
to initiate GSS encryption or not could result in two different server
keytabs being used.

I think we'd be best off to always override KRB5_KTNAME if we have a
nonempty krb_server_keyfile setting, so the attached proposed patch
makes both functions do it the same way. (I did not make an effort
to remove the dependency on setenv, given the nearby thread to
standardize on that.)

I'm not sure whether there's any documentation change that needs to
be made. The docs don't suggest that you're allowed to set
krb_server_keyfile to an empty string in the first place, so maybe
we needn't explain what happens if you do.

regards, tom lane