From: | Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> |
---|---|
To: | Jacob Champion <jchampion(at)timescale(dot)com> |
Cc: | Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: [PATCH] Log details for client certificate failures |
Date: | 2022-07-19 16:14:32 |
Message-ID: | 20220719161432.qha3s76vyc6k4v5m@awork3.anarazel.de |
Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Hi,
On 2022-07-19 09:07:31 -0700, Jacob Champion wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 15, 2022 at 4:45 PM Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> wrote:
> > On 2022-07-15 14:51:38 -0700, Jacob Champion wrote:
> > > That seems much worse than escaping for this particular patch; if your
> > > cert's Common Name is in (non-ASCII) UTF-8 then all you'll see is
> > > "CN=?????????" in the log lines that were supposed to be helping you
> > > root-cause. Escaping would be much more helpful in this case.
> >
> > I'm doubtful that's all that common.
>
> Probably not, but the more systems that support it without weird
> usability bugs, the more common it will hopefully become.
>
> > But either way, I suggest a separate patch to deal with that...
>
> Proposed fix attached, which uses \x-escaping for bytes outside of
> printable ASCII.
I don't think this should be open coded in the ssl part of the code. IMO this
should replace the existing ascii escape function instead. I strongly oppose
open coding this functionality in prepare_cert_name().
Greetings,
Andres Freund
From | Date | Subject | |
---|---|---|---|
Next Message | Andres Freund | 2022-07-19 16:28:14 | Re: Memory leak fix in psql |
Previous Message | Jacob Champion | 2022-07-19 16:07:31 | Re: [PATCH] Log details for client certificate failures |