Re: storing an explicit nonce

Greetings,

* Bruce Momjian (bruce(at)momjian(dot)us) wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 08:40:17AM +0300, Ants Aasma wrote:
> > On Mon, 11 Oct 2021 at 22:15, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> wrote:
> >
> > > Yes, that's the direction that I was thinking also and specifically with
> > > XTS as the encryption algorithm to allow us to exclude the LSN but keep
> > > everything else, and to address the concern around the nonce/tweak/etc
> > > being the same sometimes across multiple writes.  Another thing to
> > > consider is if we want to encrypt zero'd page.  There was a point
> > > brought up that if we do then we are encrypting a fair bit of very
> > > predictable bytes and that's not great (though there's a fair bit about
> > > our pages that someone could quite possibly predict anyway based on
> > > table structures and such...).  I would think that if it's easy enough
> > > to not encrypt zero'd pages that we should avoid doing so.  Don't recall
> > > offhand which way zero'd pages were being handled already but thought it
> > > made sense to mention that as part of this discussion.
> >
> > Yeah, I wanted to mention that.  I don't see any security difference
> > between fully-zero pages, pages with headers and no tuples, and pages
> > with headers and only a few tuples.  If any of those are insecure, they
> > all are.  Therefore, I don't see any reason to treat them differently.
> >
> >
> > We had to special case zero pages and not encrypt them because as far as I can
> > tell, there is no atomic way to extend a file and initialize it to Enc(zero) in
> > the same step.
>
> Oh, good point. Yeah, we will need to handle that.

Not sure what's meant here by 'handle that', but I don't see any
particular reason to avoid doing exactly the same for zero pages with
TDE in core..? I don't think there's any reason we need to make things
complicated to ensure that we encrypt entirely empty pages.

Thanks,

Stephen