Re: Key management with tests

Greetings,

* Bruce Momjian (bruce(at)momjian(dot)us) wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 02:19:22PM -0500, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > outputs from the GCM encryption and is what provides the integrity /
> > authentication of the encrypted data to be able to detect if it's been
> > modified. Unfortunately, while the page checksum will continue to be
> > used and available for checking against disk corruption, it's not
> > sufficient. Hence, ideally, we'd find a spot to stick the 128-bit tag
> > on each page.
>
> Agreed. Would checksums be of any value with GCM?

The value would be to allow testing of the database integrity, to the
amount allowed by the checksum, to be done without having access to the
encryption keys, and because there's not much else we'd be using those
bits for if we didn't.

> > Given that, clearly, it's not possible to go from an unencrypted cluster
> > to an encrypted cluster without rewriting the entire cluster, we aren't
> > bound to maintain the on-disk page format, we should be able to
> > accomadate including the tag somewhere. Unfortuantely, it doesn't seem
> > quite as trivial as I'd hoped since there are parts of the code which
> > make assumptions about the page beyond perhaps what they should be, but
> > I'm still hopeful that it won't be *too* hard to do.
>
> OK, thanks. Are there other page improvements we should make when we
> are requiring a page rewrite?

This is an interesting question but ultimately I don't think we should
be looking at this from the perspective of allowing arbitrary changes to
the page format. The challenge is that much of the page format, today,
is defined by a C struct and changing the way that works would require a
great deal of code to be modified and turn this into a massive effort,
assuming we wish to have the same compiled binary able to work with both
unencrypted and encrypted clusters, which I do believe is a requirement.

The thought that I had was to, instead, try to figure out if we could
fudge some space by, say, putting a 128-bit 'hole' at the end of the
page and just move pd_special back, effectively making the page seem
'smaller' to all of the code that uses it, except for the code that
knows how to do the decryption. I ran into some trouble with that but
haven't quite sorted out what happened yet. Other ideas would be to put
it before pd_special, or maybe somewhere else, but a lot depends on the
code's expectations.

Thanks,

Stephen