From: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> |
---|---|
To: | Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com> |
Cc: | Masahiko Sawada <sawada(dot)mshk(at)gmail(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Antonin Houska <ah(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi(dot)haribabu(at)gmail(dot)com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3(at)lab(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar(dot)ahmad(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
Date: | 2019-07-05 19:41:16 |
Message-ID: | 20190705194116.cswvzmc65kuz2mht@momjian.us |
Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 07:07:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> On 6/15/19 9:28 PM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > There are no known non-exhaustive plaintext attacks on AES:
> >
> > https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1512/why-is-aes-resistant-to-known-plaintext-attacks
>
> Even that non-authoritative stackexchange thread has varying opinions.
> Surely you don't claim that limiting know plaintext as much as is
> practical is a bad idea in general.
AES is used to encrypt TLS/https, and web traffic is practically always
mostly-known plaintext. I don't know of any cases where only part of a
webpage is encrypted by TLS to avoid encrypting known plaintext.
--
Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com
+ As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. +
+ Ancient Roman grave inscription +
From | Date | Subject | |
---|---|---|---|
Next Message | Alvaro Herrera | 2019-07-05 19:46:28 | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
Previous Message | Bruce Momjian | 2019-07-05 19:38:28 | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |