Re: pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check

Greg,

* Greg Stark (stark(at)mit(dot)edu) wrote:
> I tend to agree. But in the past when this came up people pointed out
> you could equally do things this way and still grant all the access
> you wanted using SECURITY DEFINER. Arguably that's a better approach
> because then instead of auditing the entire monitor script you only
> need to audit this one wrapper function, pg_ls_monitor_dir() which
> just calls pg_ls_dir() on this one directory.

I'm not a fan of SECURITY DEFINER functions for this sort of thing and
don't like the suggestion of simply wrapping functions that provide
superuser-level access in a security definer function and then saying
that giving someone access to that function isn't giving them superuser,
because that's just false.

Thanks!

Stephen