Re: Log operating system user connecting via unix socket

Tom,

* Tom Lane (tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us) wrote:
> Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> writes:
> > What I think we really want here is logging of the general 'system
> > user' for all auth methods instead of only for the 'peer' method.
>
> Well, we don't really know that except in a small subset of auth
> methods. I agree that when we do know it, it's useful info to log.

Right.

> My big beef with the proposed patch is that the log message is emitted
> unconditionally. There are lots and lots of users who feel that during
> normal operation, *zero* log messages should get emitted. Those villagers
> would be on our doorsteps with pitchforks if we shipped this patch as-is.

Agreed.

> I would propose that this information should be emitted only when
> log_connections is enabled, and indeed that it should be part of the
> log_connections message not a separate message. So this leads to
> thinking that somehow, the code for individual auth methods should
> be able to return an "additional info" field for inclusion in
> log_connections. We already have such a concept for auth failures,
> cf commit 5e0b5dcab.

Apologies if it wasn't clear, but that's exactly what I was suggesting
by saying to add it to PerformAuthentication, which is where we emit
the connection info when log_connections is enabled.

> > ... and also make it available in pg_stat_activity.
>
> That's moving the goalposts quite a bit, and I'm not sure it's necessary
> or even desirable. Let's just get this added to log_connections output,
> and then see if there's field demand for more.

This was in context of peer_cn, which is just a specific "system user"
value and which we're already showing in pg_stat_* info tables. I'd
love to have the Kerberos principal available, but I don't think it'd
make sense to have a 'pg_stat_kerberos' just for that.

I agree that it's moving the goalposts for this patch and could be an
independent patch, but I don't see it as any different, from a
desirability and requirements perspective, than what we're doing for SSL
connections.

Thanks!

Stephen