Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users

On 2015-08-31 09:06:27 -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> Perhaps it really isn't moving the bar all that much but at least for a
> number of our users, it's increasing what they have to be worrying about
> ("well, we knew usernames were an issue, but now we also have to worry
> about system usersnames and the CN in the certificate and...").

And to the majority it makes this behave entirely incoherent…

Who would realistically have a randomized username that people log in
with, and then CNs with meaningful contents? That'd mean you'd have to
write complex user mappings between CNs and usernames.

> The answer, in my view at least, isn't necessairly to seperate the CN
> from the username and make them differently levels of access or
> sensitivity, but rather to allow administrators to control access to
> that collective set of information.

I don't think anybody argues against that.

I'm just saying that we should strive to behave at least somewhat
consistently, and change everything at once, not piecemal. Because the
latter will not decrease the pain of migrating to a new model in a
relevant way while making the system harder to understand.

Greetings,

Andres Freund