| From: | Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> |
|---|---|
| To: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> |
| Cc: | Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
| Date: | 2015-07-07 16:11:42 |
| Message-ID: | 20150707161142.GE10242@alap3.anarazel.de |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On 2015-07-07 12:03:36 -0400, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> I think the DN is analogous to the remote user name, which we don't
> expose for any of the other authentication methods.
Huh?
Datum
pg_stat_get_activity(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
/* Values available to all callers */
values[0] = ObjectIdGetDatum(beentry->st_databaseid);
values[1] = Int32GetDatum(beentry->st_procpid);
values[2] = ObjectIdGetDatum(beentry->st_userid);
...
Isn't that like, essentially, all of them? Sure, if you have a ident
mapping set up, then not, but I have a hard time seing that as a
relevant use case.
> I think the default approach for security and authentication related
> information should be conservative, even if there is not a specific
> reason. Or to put it another way: What is the motivation for showing
> this information at all?
That we already show equivalent information and that hiding it from
another place will just be crufty and make monitoring setups more
complex.
Greetings,
Andres Freund
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