From: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> |
---|---|
To: | Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> |
Cc: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Abhijit Menon-Sen <ams(at)2ndQuadrant(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Christoph Berg <myon(at)debian(dot)org>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: fsync-pgdata-on-recovery tries to write to more files than previously |
Date: | 2015-05-29 18:28:36 |
Message-ID: | 20150529182836.GC26667@tamriel.snowman.net |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
* Andres Freund (andres(at)anarazel(dot)de) wrote:
> On 2015-05-29 13:49:16 -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> > > That sounds like a potentially nontrivial amount of repetitive log bleat
> > > after every crash start? One which the user can't really stop?
> >
> > Why can't the user stop it?
>
> Because it makes a good amount of sense to have e.g. certificates not
> owned by postgres and not writeable? You don't necessarily want to
> symlink them somewhere else, because that makes moving clusters around
> harder than when they're self contained.
A certain other file might be non-writable by PG too... (*cough* .auto
*cough*).
> > I'd say it's a pretty damn-fool arrangement: for starters, it's an
> > unnecessary security hazard.
>
> I don't buy the security argument at all. You likely have
> postgresql.conf in the data directoy. You can write to at least .auto,
> which will definitely reside the data directory. That contains
> archive_command.
I'm not sure that I see the security issue here either.. We're not
talking about setuid shell scripts or anything that isn't running as the
PG user, which a superuser could take over anyway..
Thanks!
Stephen
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