| From: | Andres Freund <andres(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
| Cc: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Adam Brightwell <adam(dot)brightwell(at)crunchydatasolutions(dot)com>, Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions |
| Date: | 2014-10-29 16:11:54 |
| Message-ID: | 20141029161154.GD17724@awork2.anarazel.de |
| Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
| Thread: | |
| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On 2014-10-29 12:09:00 -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> writes:
> > * Robert Haas (robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com) wrote:
> >> I think the question is "just how innumerable are those attack
> >> routes"? So, we can prevent a symlink from being used via O_NOFOLLOW.
> >> But what about hard links?
>
> > You can't hard link to files you don't own.
>
> That restriction exists on only some platforms.
Yea, it's nothing we can rely on. I do think checking the link count to
be 1 is safe though.
> Current OS X for instance
> seems perfectly willing to allow it (suggesting that most BSDen probably
> do likewise), and I see no language supporting your claim in the POSIX
> spec for link(2).
I'd argue that there's no point in treating OSX as a securable platform
:P
Greetings,
Andres Freund
--
Andres Freund http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
| From | Date | Subject | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Next Message | Tom Lane | 2014-10-29 16:14:37 | Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions |
| Previous Message | Stephen Frost | 2014-10-29 16:10:02 | Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions |