From: | Noah Misch <noah(at)leadboat(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> |
Cc: | pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks |
Date: | 2012-12-19 00:41:58 |
Message-ID: | 20121219004158.GA31760@tornado.leadboat.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Dec 18, 2012 at 12:09:10PM -0500, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> There are some system administration functions that have hardcoded
> superuser checks, specifically:
>
> pg_reload_conf
> pg_rotate_logfile
> pg_read_file
> pg_read_file_all
> pg_read_binary_file
> pg_read_binary_file_all
> pg_stat_file
> pg_ls_dir
>
> Some of these are useful in monitoring or maintenance tools, and the
> hardcoded superuser checks require that these tools run with maximum
> privileges. Couldn't we just install these functions without default
> privileges and allow users to grant privileges as necessary?
+1. You can already use a SECURITY DEFINER wrapper, so I don't think this
opens any particular floodgate. GRANT is a nicer interface. However, I would
not advertise this as a replacement for wrapper functions until pg_dump can
preserve ACL changes to pg_catalog objects.
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