From: | "Jim C(dot) Nasby" <decibel(at)decibel(dot)org> |
---|---|
To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, bugtraq(at)securityfocus(dot)com |
Subject: | Re: Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted passwords |
Date: | 2005-04-20 22:08:30 |
Message-ID: | 20050420220830.GV58835@decibel.org |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Apr 20, 2005 at 06:03:18PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Well, I have no particular problem with offering SHA1 as an alternative
> hash method for those who find MD5 too weak ... but I still question the
> value of putting any random salt in the table. AFAICS you would have to
> send that salt as part of the initial password challenge, which means
> any potential attacker could find it out even before trying to
> compromise pg_shadow; so Stephen's argument that there is a useful
> improvement in protection against precomputation of password hashes
> still falls down.
>
> BTW, one could also ask exactly what threat model Stephen is concerned
> about. ISTM anyone who can obtain the contents of pg_shadow has
> *already* broken your database security.
FWIW, I do think there's some benefit to not being able to pre-compute
an entire hash table for accounts such as 'postgres' and 'www'. But I
agree it would be useful to know the actual threat model.
--
Jim C. Nasby, Database Consultant decibel(at)decibel(dot)org
Give your computer some brain candy! www.distributed.net Team #1828
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