From: | Euler Taveira de Oliveira <euler(at)ufgnet(dot)ufg(dot)br> |
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To: | Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au> |
Cc: | pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: Increasing security in a shared environment ... |
Date: | 2004-03-29 17:08:04 |
Message-ID: | 20040329140804.377fee13.euler@ufgnet.ufg.br |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Hi Christopher,
> > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is
> > authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the
> > current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much
> > information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set PG to do this, but that
> > should probably be the default."
> >
Seem reasonable. Why not prevent normal users to dig on the pg_catalog? What is the impact of it?
> Well, you can just go SELECT * FROM pg_database; so fixing \l won't do
> anything.
>
> I too would like to see more security in this respect, but it will be
> difficult if not impossible to implement methinks...
>
Why is it "impossible"?
--
Euler Taveira de Oliveira
euler (at) ufgnet.ufg.br
Desenvolvedor Web e Administrador de Sistemas
UFGNet - Universidade Federal de Goiás
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