Re: 2nd cut at SSL documentation

I have added this to backend/libpq/README.SSL to be integrated into our
main docs later.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bear Giles wrote:
> A second cut at SSL documentation....
>
>
>
> SSL Support in PostgreSQL
> =========================
>
> Who needs it?
> =============
>
> The sites that require SSL fall into one (or more) of several broad
> categories.
>
> *) They have insecure networks.
>
> Examples of insecure networks are anyone in a "corporate hotel,"
> any network with 802.11b wireless access points (WAP) (in 2002,
> this protocol has many well-known security weaknesses and even
> 'gold' connections can be broken within 8 hours), or anyone
> accessing their database over the internet.
>
> These sites need a Virtual Private Network (VPN), and either
> SSH tunnels or direct SSL connections can be used.
>
> *) They are storing extremely sensitive information.
>
> An example of extremely sensitive information is logs from
> network intrusion detection systems. This information *must*
> be fully encrypted between front- and back-end since an attacker
> is presumably sniffing all traffic within the VPN, and if they
> learn that you know what they are doing they may attempt to
> cover their tracks with a quick 'rm -rf /' and 'dropdb'
>
> In the extreme case, the contents of the database itself may
> be encrypted with either the crypt package (which provides
> symmetrical encryption of the records) or the PKIX package
> (which provides public-key encryption of the records).
>
> *) They are storing information which is considered confidential
> by custom, law or regulation.
>
> This includes all records held by your doctor, lawyer, accountant,
> etc. In these cases, the motivation for using encryption is not
> a conscious evaulation of risk, but the fear of liability for
> 'failure to perform due diligence' if encryption is available but
> unused and an attacker gains unauthorized access to the harm of
> others.
>
> *) They have 'road warriors.'
>
> This includes all sites where people need to have direct access
> to the database (not through a proxy such as a secure web page)
> from changing remote addresses. Client certificates provide a
> clean way to grant this access without opening up the database
> to the world.
>
> Who does not need it?
> ---------------------
>
> It's at least as important to know who does not need SSL as it
> is to know who does. Sites that do not need SSL fall into several
> broad categories.
>
> *) Access is limited to the Unix socket.
>
> *) Access is limited to a physically secure network.
>
> "Physically secure" networks are common in the clusters and
> colocation sites - all database traffic is restricted to dedicated
> NIC cards and hubs, and all servers and cabling are maintained in
> locked cabinets.
>
>
> Using SSH/OpenSSH as a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
> ====================================================
>
> SSH and OpenSSH can be used to construct a Virtual Private Network
> (VPN) to provide confidentiality of PostgreSQL communications.
> These tunnels are widely available and fairly well understood, but
> do not provide any application-level authentication information.
>
> To set up a SSH/OpenSSH tunnel, a shell account for each
> user should be set up on the database server. It is acceptable
> for the shell program to be bogus (e.g., /bin/false), if the
> tunnel is set up in to avoid launching a remote shell.
>
> On each client system the $HOME/.ssh/config file should contain
> an additional line similiar to
>
> LocalForward 5555 psql.example.com:5432
>
> (replacing psql.example.com with the name of your database server).
> By putting this line in the configuration file, instead of specifying
> it on the command line, the tunnel will be created whenever a
> connection is made to the remote system.
>
> The psql(1) client (or any client) should be wrapped with a script
> that establishes an SSH tunnel when the program is launched:
>
> #!/bin/sh
> HOST=psql.example.com
> IDENTITY=$HOME/.ssh/identity.psql
> /usr/bin/ssh -1 -i $IDENTITY -n $HOST 'sleep 60' & \
> /usr/bin/psql -h $HOST -p 5555 $1
>
> Alternately, the system could run a daemon that establishes and maintains
> the tunnel. This is preferrable when multiple users need to establish
> similar tunnels to the same remote site.
>
> Unfortunately, there are many potential drawbacks to SSL tunnels:
>
> *) the SSH implementation or protocol may be flawed. Serious problems
> are discovered about once every 18- to 24- months.
>
> *) the systems may be misconfigured by accident.
>
> *) the database server must provide shell accounts for all users
> needing access. This can be a chore to maintain, esp. in if
> all other user access should be denied.
>
> *) neither the front- or back-end can determine the level of
> encryption provided by the SSH tunnel - or even whether an
> SSH tunnel is in use. This prevents security-aware clients
> from refusing any connection with unacceptly weak encryption.
>
> *) neither the front- or back-end can get any authentication
> information pertaining to the SSH tunnel.
>
> Bottom line: if you just need a VPN, SSH tunnels are a good solution.
> But if you explicitly need a secure connection they're inadequate.
>
>
> Direct SSL Support
> ==================
>
> Insecure Channel: ANONYMOUS DH Server
> -------------------------------------
>
> "ANONYMOUS DH" is the most basic SSL implementation. It does
> not require a server certificate, but it is vulnerable to
> "man-in-the-middle" attacks.
>
> The PostgreSQL backend does not support ANONYMOUS DH sessions.
>
>
> Secure Channel: Server Authentication
> -------------------------------------
>
> Server Authentication requires that the server authenticate itself
> to clients (via certificates), but clients can remain anonymous.
> This protects clients from "man-in-the-middle" attacks (where a
> bogus server either captures all data or provides bogus data),
> but does not protect the server from bad data injected by false
> clients.
>
> The community has established a set of criteria for secure
> communications:
>
> *) the server must provide a certificate identifying itself
> via its own fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in the
> certificate's Common Name (CN) field.
>
> *) the FQDN in the server certificate must resolve to the
> IP address used in the connection.
>
> *) the certificate must be valid. (The current date must be
> no earlier than the 'notBefore' date, and no later than the
> 'notAfter' date.)
>
> *) the server certificate must be signed by an issuer certificate
> known to the clients.
>
> This issuer can be a known public CA (e.g., Verisign), a locally
> generated root cert installed with the database client, or the
> self-signed server cert installed with the database client.
>
> Another approach (used by SSH and most web clients) is for the
> client to prompt the user whether to accept a new root cert when
> it is encountered for the first time. psql(1) does not currently
> support this mechanism.
>
> *) the client *should* check the issuer's Certificate Revocation
> List (CRL) to verify that the server's certificate hasn't been
> revoked for some reason, but in practice this step is often
> skipped.
>
> *) the server private key must be owned by the database process
> and not world-accessible. It is recommended that the server
> key be encrypted, but it is not required if necessary for the
> operation of the system. (Primarily to allow automatic restarts
> after the system is rebooted.)
>
> The 'mkcert.sh' script can be used to generate and install
> suitable certificates
>
> Finally, the client library can have one or more trusted root
> certificates compiled into it. This allows clients to verify
> certificates without the need for local copies. To do this,
> the source file src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c must be edited
> and the database recompiled.
>
> Secure Channel: Mutual Authentication
> -------------------------------------
>
> Mutual authentication requires that servers and clients each
> authenticate to the other. This protects the server from
> false clients in addition to protecting the clients from false
> servers.
>
> The community has established a set of criteria for client
> authentication similar to the list above.
>
> *) the client must provide a certificate identifying itself.
> The certificate's Common Name (CN) field should contain the
> client's usual name.
>
> *) the client certificate must be signed by a certificate known
> to the server.
>
> If a local root cert was used to sign the server's cert, the
> client certs can be signed by the issuer.
>
> *) the certificate must be valid. (The current date must be
> no earlier than the 'notBefore' date, and no later than the
> 'notAfter' date.)
>
> *) the server *should* check the issuer's Certificate Revocation
> List (CRL) to verify that the clients's certificate hasn't been
> revoked for some reason, but in practice this step is often
> skipped.
>
> *) the client's private key must be owned by the client process
> and not world-accessible. It is recommended that the client
> key be encrypted, but because of technical reasons in the
> architecture of the client library this is not yet supported.
>
> PostgreSQL can generate client certificates via a four-step process.
>
> 1. The "client.conf" file must be copied from the server. Certificates
> can be highly localizable, and this file contains information that
> will be needed later.
>
> The client.conf file is normally installed in /etc/postgresql/root.crt.
> The client should also copy the server's root.crt file to
> $HOME/.postgresql/root.crt.
>
> 2. If the user has the OpenSSL applications installed, they can
> run pgkeygen.sh. (An equivalent compiled program will be available
> in the future.) They should provide a copy of the
> $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.pem file to their DBA.
>
> 3. The DBA should sign this file the OpenSSL applications:
>
> $ openssl ca -config root.conf -ss_cert ....
>
> and return the signed cert (postgresql.crt) to the user.
>
> 4. The user should install this file in $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.crt.
>
> The server will log every time a client certificate has been
> used, but there is not yet a mechanism provided for using client
> certificates as PostgreSQL authentication at the application level.
>
>
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