From: | Bruce Momjian <pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us> |
---|---|
To: | Neil Conway <neilc(at)samurai(dot)com> |
Cc: | "Marc G(dot) Fournier" <scrappy(at)hub(dot)org>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: [GENERAL] PostgreSQL 7.2.2: Security Release |
Date: | 2002-08-24 04:38:07 |
Message-ID: | 200208240438.g7O4c8225214@candle.pha.pa.us |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-announce pgsql-general pgsql-hackers |
The issue is data-provoked crashes vs. query-invoked crashes. Marc's
point, and I think it was clear enough, is that you can't just poke at
the TCP port and hope to do anything bad, which was the thrust of the
argument, I think.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neil Conway wrote:
> "Marc G. Fournier" <scrappy(at)hub(dot)org> writes:
> > On 24 Aug 2002, Neil Conway wrote:
> > > If the application is accepting datetime input from the user ('what's
> > > your birthday?', for example), and isn't doing some non-obvious input
> > > validation on it (namely, checking that the input string isn't too
> > > long), you can crash the backend. Gavin says executing arbitrary code
> > > using the hole would be extremely difficult, but it's at least
> > > conceivable.
> >
> > Right, but you have to get a connection to the backend in order to crash
> > it ... no?
>
> You need to be using an application accepts datetime input from the
> user, and at some point inserts it into the database. For example, if
> you wrote a webapp that accepted datetime input of some kind (to use
> my previous example, the user's birthday), any user of the webapp
> could enter bogus data that would crash the backend.
>
> In this case, the user does not make a connection to the backend (the
> web app does), and does not have the ability to execute arbitrary SQL
> (i.e. it's not a "shared" or "open" system) -- but a security problem
> still exists.
>
> This is in contrast to the other security holes (repeat(), lpad(),
> rpad(), SET TIME ZONE, and TZ env var), in which the probability of
> someone without SQL access being able to exercise the bug is
> negligible.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Neil
>
>
> --
> Neil Conway <neilc(at)samurai(dot)com> || PGP Key ID: DB3C29FC
>
>
--
Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us
pgman(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us | (610) 359-1001
+ If your life is a hard drive, | 13 Roberts Road
+ Christ can be your backup. | Newtown Square, Pennsylvania 19073
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