From: | todd brandys <brandys(at)eng3(dot)hep(dot)uiuc(dot)edu> |
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To: | maillist(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us |
Cc: | pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: [HACKERS] Re: New pg_pwd patch and stuff |
Date: | 1998-01-18 21:29:50 |
Message-ID: | 199801182129.AA01155@eng3.hep.uiuc.edu |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
> Well, I can create the table quite easily. The issue is what type of
> flack we will get by haveing pg_user non-readable, and removing the user
What if we were to put the pg_user accessibility to the admin setting up
PostgreSQL (at least until pg_privileges could become a reality.). If you
look in dbinit--toward the end of the script--I run a SQL command to revoke
all privileges from public on the pg_user table. If you are not going to
use the pg_pwd scheme for authentication, then you don't need to run this
command. All we need do for now is print out a little message saying that if
you use HBA or Kerberos, then say No to blocking the PUBLIC from accessing
pg_user. We also say that if you choose to block access to pg_user, these
are the consequences. When a better privileges method is developed this
question in the dbinit script can be eliminated.
I myself would choose to block access to the pg_user relation. Others may not
want it this way. Using the above scenario, the user would have an informed
choice that would be taken care of at initialization.
Todd A. Brandys
brandys(at)eng3(dot)hep(dot)uiuc(dot)edu
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