Re: Remove last traces of SCM credential auth from libpq?

From: "Jonathan S(dot) Katz" <jkatz(at)postgresql(dot)org>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>
Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Remove last traces of SCM credential auth from libpq?
Date: 2023-03-16 17:28:51
Message-ID: 147acee4-24eb-7eff-635e-4762aed6843d@postgresql.org
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On 3/16/23 10:49 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
> Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz> writes:
>> libpq has kept some code related to the support of authentication with
>> SCM credentials for some time now, code dead in the backend since
>> 9.1. Wouldn't it be time to let it go and remove this code entirely,
>> erroring in libpq if attempting to connect to a server that supports
>> that?
>
> +1. Since that's only used on Unix-domain sockets, it could only be
> useful if you were using current libpq while talking to a pre-9.1
> server on the same machine.

+1.

> Also, in pg_fe_sendauth, couldn't you just let the default: case
> handle it instead of adding a bespoke error message? We're not
> really expecting that anyone is ever going to hit this, so I'm
> not convinced it's worth the translation burden.

+1 to this, that was my thought as well. That would let us remove the
"AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS" constant too.

It looks like in the po files there are a bunch of "SCM_CRED
authentication method not supported" messages that can also be removed.

Thanks,

Jonathan

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