Re: Compromised postgresql instances

Andrew Dunstan <andrew(dot)dunstan(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
> On 06/08/2018 04:34 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
>> I've noticed a steady trickle of reports of postgresql servers being compromised via being left available to the internet with insecure or default configuration, or brute-forced credentials. The symptoms are randomly named binaries being uploaded to the data directory and executed with the permissions of the postgresql user, apparently via an extension or an untrusted PL.
>>
>> Is anyone tracking or investigating this?

> Please cite actual instances of such reports. Vague queries like this
> help nobody.

I imagine Steve is reacting to this report from today:
https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CANozSKLGgWDpzfua2L=OGFN=Dg3Po98UjqJJ18gBVFR1-yK5+A@mail.gmail.com

I recall something similar being reported a few weeks ago, but am
too lazy to trawl the archives right now.

> Furthermore, security concerns are best addressed to the security
> mailing list.

Unless there's some evidence that these attacks are getting in through
a heretofore unknown PG security vulnerability, rather than user
misconfiguration (such as weak/no password), I'm not sure what the
security list would have to offer. Right now it seems like Steve's move
to try to gather more evidence is quite the right thing to do.

regards, tom lane