From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
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To: | Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: allow building trusted languages without the untrusted versions |
Date: | 2022-05-23 17:17:08 |
Message-ID: | 1290329.1653326228@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
> On Fri, May 20, 2022 at 08:20:11PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
>> Lastly, you've offered no reason to think this would provide any real
>> security improvement. Someone who's gained the ability to issue CREATE
>> EXTENSION on untrusted extensions has already got all the privileges he
>> needs; leaving out a few extension files is at most going to slow him
>> down a bit on the way to full filesystem access. (See, eg, COPY TO
>> PROGRAM.)
> I'd like to provide the ability to disallow these other things, too. This
> is intended to be a first step in that direction.
There would probably be some interest in a "--disable-disk-access"
configure option that did all of this stuff (and some more things
too), with the aim of locking down *all* known paths to filesystem
access. I don't see much value in retail options that do some of that.
In fact, what they might mostly accomplish is to give people a false
sense of security.
regards, tom lane
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