| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Andres Freund <andres(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Daniel Vérité <daniel(dot)verite(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
| Subject: | Re: file_fdw target file ownership |
| Date: | 2013-09-08 18:37:58 |
| Message-ID: | 12153.1378665478@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Andres Freund <andres(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> writes:
> On 2013-09-08 20:00:58 +0200, Daniel Vrit wrote:
>> Or is there a simpler way to deal with the above case?
> One would be to use open(O_NOFOLLOW)?
That would only stop symlink attacks, not hardlink variants;
and it'd probably stop some legitimate use-cases too.
> But more generally I am of the opinion that it's the superusers
> responsibility to make sure that cannot happen by only using properly
> secured files.
Yeah. ISTM that any restriction we could add that would prevent this
would present a serious obstacle to many legitimate use-cases as well.
It might be reasonable to document the scenario Daniel describes,
though.
regards, tom lane
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